by CHRISTOPHER L. BACH
HE MAGNITUDE of the United States balanceof-payments deficit and concern about the effective operation of the international monetary system dominated thinking about U.S. payments problems and policies in 1971. Dollar outflows had long been critical to the functioning of the Bretton Woods system, but the continuous accumulation of dollars by foreigners, the relative fixity of exchange rates, and effectively integrated money and capital markets led many to seek reform of the international monetary system during 1971. The objective of most proposed reforms was to diminish the importance of the dollar in the system's operation and to promote a more effective means of adjusting countries' external payments positions, including that of the United States.
For years, dollar deficits had been beneficial to both U.S. and foreign residents. Foreigners used the dollars to finance trade imbalances and to minimize costs of holding liquid transactions balances in several currencies. Countries chose to use dollars to meet their exchange rate stability obligations as members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). New York money and capital markets served as the primary source of funds (dollars) for American and foreign enterprises and dollars played a critical role in the formation and development of an important interbank market for funds -the Eurodollar market.
As U.S. payments deficits persisted, the supply of dollars in the hands of foreign residents became more than was necessary for minimal foreign private liquidity purposes and for exchange into American goods and financial instruments. The willingness of private foreigners to hold additional dollar deposits (or dollar claims) above minimum levels declined after the mid1960s when the potential dollar claims exceeded the available gold stock. Evidence of the decline in demand for dollars was indicated by their sale to central banks by private foreigners. It was the continuing dollar deficits plus the decline in the willingness of foreigners to hold dollar balances that finally hindered effective operation of the international monetary system in 1971.
In May, official foreigners indicated their unwillingness to accumulate more dollars. On August 15 the United States indicated it was no longer willing to tolerate the projected balance-of-payments deficits. It suspended convertibility of dollars into gold, imposed an import surcharge, and announced its intention to seek a realignment of parity rates and multinational cooperation on reform of the international monetary system.
Reactions to the Deficit
Reactions to the U.S. payments deficit in 1971 were divided into two timne periods by the President's announcement of August 15.
Recent marked reserve accumulation among industrial countries other than the United States began in 1970. Little importance was attached to the fact at that time. Many nations had seen some decline in the foreign exchange component of their reserves from preceding ears with the flow of short-term dollars from Europe to the United States. The reserve inflows in 1970 returned the reserve balances to their previous levels, but as the U.S. deficit increased in 1971. reserve accumulation became. a source of concern.
In early April, all major currencies began to appreciate against the dollar in the forward exchange markets because of the large interest-rate differentials between this country and abroad, and perhaps, in anticipation of an impending fonnal decline in the relative value of the dollar. Many industrial countries had difficulty in restraining domestic inflation while meeting their exchange-rate stability responsibilities under the rules of the IMF.' Swap lines with Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany were activated in an attempt to reduce declines in U.S. reserve assets. Further action by the United States to slow the dollar outflow involved the renewed sale by the Export-Import Bank and the U.S. Treasury of special three-month certificates of indebtedness to foreign branches and agencies of U.S. banks. Several foreign central banks lowered their discount rates in late March and April in order to narrow, or even reverse, the interest arbitrage spreads which had been in favor of domestic currencies in the first quarter.
The Eurodollar market remained calm in the first quarter of 1971 as it had throughout 1970. Eurodollar rates declined as many Eurodollar borrowings were repaid, particularly by U.S. banks, and rates fell well below most European interest rates. In contrast to normal times of 1970 and early 1971,when the Eurodollar market served as an international intermediary both for depositors seeking high rates of return on their money balances and for borrowers seeking lower cost credit than they could obtain at home, the Eurodollar market took on an increasingly speculative tone in the second quarter of 1971. As exchange rate uncertainties increased and banks and businesses borrowed funds in the Eurodollar market for conversion into domestic currencies, the rate rose rapidly. In ' The country most sensitive to the U.S. deficit and international financial conditions in the first half of the year was Germany. Faced with a particularly large inflow of dollars, substantial domestic inflation, and interest rates well above the Eurodollar money market rates, the Bundesbank suspended its foreign exchange operations in the wake of a $1 billlon inflow over May 3-4, and an additional $1 billion inflow in the first forty minutes of trading on the morning of May 5. The Frankfurt market reopened on May 10 with an announcement by the Bundesbank that trading limits for the mark would be suspended temporarily, although the official parity was to remain unchanged. This action pernutted the German government to continue its restrictive stabilization policies. It chose to supplement the action by announcing on June 2 an increase in banks' minimum reserve requirements of 15 percent across the board, while the requirements against foreign liabilities were raised to twice the level of the new domestic requirements.
Shortly after the German decision, speculative pressures shifted to other "strong" national currencies. The Netherlands subsequently permitted the guilder to fluctuate and Belgium strengthened its two exchange rate system -one official and one financial -and perinitted the latter to appreciate. Switzerland and Austria raised their parities by 7,07 and 5.05 percent, respectively.
The release of the second quarter U.S. balance-ofpayments data indicated a marked deterioration in the U.S. external position, and when combined with the behavior of fluctuating exchange rates in July and August, offered additional evidence that the dollar might need to be devalued. U.S. reserve assets had diminished to about $12.1 billion in mid-August from $14.6 billion at the beginning of the year, and nearly 45 percent of the $2.5 billion decline came in early The United States suspended convertibility of the dollar into gold on August 15.
In addition to the suspension of dollar convertibility and a program designed to reduce unemployment and domestic price-wage pressures, the President's program of August 15 imposed an additional tax (surcharge) of 10 percent on goods imported into the United States. The apparent purpose of the surtax was to set the stage for useful international negotiations to achieve a realigmuient of currencies and a better access to foreign markets for American producers. As a related measure, the President ordered a 10 percent reduction in foreign aid. The President Economic Report describes the import surcharge as applying only to "goods on which duties had been reduced under reciprocal trade agreements, and in no case . . . was it to raise a duty beyond the statutory rate. Where it was limited by the statntory ceiling, the surcharge was less than 10 percent. On automobiles, in particular, the tax amounted only to 6.5 percent. Furthermore, all imports subject to mandatory quantitative restrictions were exempt from the new tax. Such goods included petroleum, sugar, 2 Federal Reserve swap lines with foreign central banks and the Bank for International Settlements were drawn on in the amount of $3,565 million between January 1 and August 13. During the same period $1,330 nuillion in current and previous drawings were repaid by misc of foreign currency balances and Special Drawing Rights, through U.S. horrowing from the International Monetary Fund, and thrommgh the sale of special securities to foreign official institutions. On August 15 there was a total of $3,045 million of swap indebtedness outstanding compared to $810 million on January 1. meat and dairy products, certain other agricultural products, and cotton textiles covered by the LongTerm Textile Agreement. The surcharge affected about one-half of U.S. impofts.'~Subsequent announcements confined the Job Development Tax Credit to domesucally produced machinery and equipment as long as the import surcharge remained in effect.
Despite the price freeze on domestically produced items, prices of imported goods were allowed to rise by the full amount of the additional duty imposed. Prices of items assembled or produced in the United States with foreign components would also be allowed to rise by the amount of the additional duty levied on the foreign conuponents. The President also removed the 7 percent excise tax on autos which was applicable to imported as well as domestic cars.
The European exchange markets were closed for a week following the President's announcement. When the markets reopened, no major industrial country except France tried to maintain the value of its currency against the dollar within the one percent upper limit of its parity rate. In France, the foreign exchange market was separated into a muarket for dollars received as a result of international trade, in which the French continued to intervene to maintain the parity value, and a "financial franc" nuarket in which all other exchanges were transacted. Although severe restrictions were inuposed on inflows of funds through the financial franc market, the exchange rate was allowed to find its own level.
The Japanese government initially tried to purchase all dollars offered at the ceiling rate, but in face of a $4.4 billion inflo\v in August, it was later forced to suspend the rate and limit intervention so as to permit about a 5 percent rise relative to the dollar in the subsequent nuonth. Other administrative actions to assist in limiting the appreciation of the yen relative to the dollar over the remainder of the year included placement of a ceiling on all nonresident free yen deposits that Japanese commercial banks might receive, proluhition of prepayment of trade bills to Japanese exporters, and a request that banks not increase their Eurodollar borrowing. Many of these exchange controls were relaxed early in 1972.
Many other countries also imposed restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, hut still permitted the 3 Economic Report of the Pte.sident, 1972, p. 148. value of their currencies to fluctuate relative to the dollar. From time to time central banks intervened in markets to limit the pace at which their currencies appreciated relative to the dollar, By early Dccciiiber, it was clear that a set of regulated exchange rates between foreign currencies and dollars had emerged which was substantially different than at the beginning of the year. Many of the new exchange rates were formalized shortly after the Smithsonian agreenucnt of December 18 by the declaration of temporary "central values," and the announcement by the United States of its willingness to raise the dollar price of gold by 8.57 percent and remove the import surcharge. Simultaneously, muost countries agreed to permit exchange-rate fluctuations within a 2.25 percent range on each side of the central value.4
Numnerous alternatives were availahle to the United States in seeking a realignment of exchange rates alter August 15. The desire to realign exchange rate patterns could have been achieved by: (I) pennitting exchange rates to float upward to their new and higher levels vis-à-vis the dollar; (2) devaluation of the dollar against other currencies; (3) revaluation of other currencies against the dollar while leavin the value of the gold content of the dollar unchanged; an (4) a combination of devaluatiqn of the dollar with respect to gold and a change in the exchange rates of other nations vip-fl-vip the dollar and each othcm. In the end, the latter path was chosen.
One of the considerations in determining the extent of exchange-rate realignment was the state of the U.S. balance of payments. The Administration concluded that the size of the required correction would be an exchange rate realignment necessary to bring a turnaround of $13 billion. Their calculations were as follows:
1. Under conditions of reasonably full employment in both the United States and other major trading countries, the U.S. deficit on curient account (excluding U.S. Coyermnent grants) for 1972 was projected to he $4 billion on the basis of the exchange rates and other trading conditions in effect in April 1971. 2. The annt~aloutflow for Government grants and credits plus private long-term capital flows from the United States to countries other than Western European natiomus, Canada, and Japan was estimated at $6 billion, or just over one-half of one percent of the U.S. gross natiotial product. The average anmtal outflow for these purposes during the 5-year period from 1967 thrtmgh 1971 was ahottt $5½billion. 3. A secmmre payments position would require that this estimated $6-billion capital cmutflow he covered by a surplus on current account. Since the projected "full-enuploynient" current account for 1972 was in deficit by $4 billion, achieving a surplus of $6 billion required an inuprovement of $10 billion in the U.5. current account. 4. Two other factors caused additions to this basic estiunite. The first was an allowance tf $1 billion a year to cover a persistent outflow, which the data collection network does not capture. This outflow, which is shown as "e and omissions" or unidentified transactions in the accounts, fluctuates from year to year, but it has been ponsistently negative since 1960. the average level being around $1 billion. The second factor~vas an allowance of $2 billion to pm-ovide the prospect of a small srmrphss on basic balance, to cover persistent short-ternu capital outflows or to serve as a margin of safety against errors in the imnderlying assumptions and calculations. With the addition of these two factors, the turnaround reqmeired for the United States to achieve a secure position was estimated to be $13 billion. average basis. About two thirds of the total trade of the United States is conducted with these countries. Against all currencies that revalued relative to the dollar, the effective devaluation was about 9.7 percent on a trade-weighted basis. These countries account for about 80 percent of total U.S. trade. Finally, against all currencies of the world, including those which did not change their exchange rate with the dollar as well as those who did -such as Israel, Ghana, South Africa, and Yugoslavia -the effective dollar devaluation on a trade-weighted basis was about 7.5 percent. By December 31, currencies of the 14 countries in the table had appreciated only 9.05 percent relative to the dollar on a trade-weighted basis.
Balance of Payments Analysis
On a yearly basis the United States balance of payments was in deficit by $22 billion on a liquidity basi and $29.8 bilhon on an official settlements basis in 1971 compared to deficit of $3.8 billion and $9. The trade account, which is an important component of the current account, declined from a surplus of $6.8 bfflion in 1964 to a deficit of $2.9 billion in 1971. Strikes had a particularly adverse effect on the balance in 1971, but deterioration can more generally be attributed to (1) the gradually increasing overvaluation of the dollar relative to other currencies, and (2) the relative income, output, and price trends in Europe and the United States. The effect of income, output, and price movements on the trade balance is discussed below.
As a general rule, movements of U.S. nonagricultural exports are related to income and output movements in other industrial nations. The accompanying chart shows that the rate of expansion in foreign industrial production varied between five and ten percent over the decade, and that fluctuations in the rate of expansion resulted in nearly simultaneous and wider fluctuations in U.S. export growth. The increase in the rate of expansion in foreign industrial production in 1967 and 1968 was followed by an acceleration in U.S. export growth, and a subsequent decline in the rate of foreign industrial production in 1970-71 by a deceleration in U.S. export growth.
Movements in U.S. imports are related to movements in U.S. GNP. Variations in GNP growth over the decade were accompanied by simultaneous, but wider, fluctuations in import growth. However, this explanation does not appear to be as valid in analyzing the import performance of 1970 and 1971 as in earlier years. Private financial short-termn capital flows generally respond to the stocks of assets held by U.S. and foreign residents as well as changes in those stocks, and the level of and changes in interest-rate differentials. In periods of greater than normal uncertainty, such as existed in part of 1971, speculative transactions may obscure these fundamental economic relationships. The major change in financial capital flows in 1971 was an increase in certain nonliquid short-term private capital outflows (loans by banks and nonbanks to finance foreign trade) by $2.0 billion to $2.5 billion from an average outflow of $0.5 billion in 1970. Errors and omissions increased to a $10.9 billion deficit in 1971 from a $1.1 billion deficit in 1970. A smnall portion of these errors and omissions (about $1 billion) represents errors in data collection and reporting. The remainder of the errors and omissions is probably highly interest-rate sensitive and reflects speculative short-term capital flows not captured by normal reporting procedures.
The net liquidity balance deteriorated in 1971 because of adverse movements on trade account, longterm private capital, and errors and omissions. The deficit was $22 billion in 1971. compared to deficits of $3.8 billion in 1970 and $6.1 billion in 1969.
The change in accounting procedures made in mid-1971, wInch included liquid short-term assets along with liquid liabilities to other than foreign official agencies as a financing item of the net liquidity balance, decreased the net liquidity deficit by $1.1 billion in 1971, while increasing it $th2 billion in 1970. The accounting change which included nonliquid U.S. Government and long-term U.S. bank liabilities to foreign official agencies as financing items of the liquidity balance decreased the liquidity deficit by a billion dollars or less in each of the last three years.
The official settlements balance increased to a $29.8 billion deficit in 1971 from a $9.8 billion deficit in 1970 and a $2.7 billion surplus in 1969. The shift from surplus to deficit in the past txvo years reflected net outflows of liquid private capital in addition to the adverse movements on trade account, long-term private capital, and errors and omissions which contributed to the liquidity deficit, These liquid dollar movements shifted from inflows of $3.2 billion and $8.8 billion in 1968 and 1969, respectively, to outflows of $6.0 billion and $7.8 billion in 1970 and 1971, respectively. Much of the outflow was associated with repayment of Eurodollar liabilities of U.S. banks to their foreign branches and agencies.
The official settlements balance was financed in 1971. by a reduction in reserve assets of $2.3 billion and a net increase of liquid and certain nouliquid liabilities to foreign official agencies of $27.4 billion. Most of the reduction in reserve assets occurred before August 15.
